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EACH year, some 48 million cargo containers move between the world’s 
ports. More than 6 million of these enter 
the U.S., but only about 2 percent are 
opened and inspected when they arrive 
at U.S. seaports. The West Coast ports of 
Los Angeles–Long Beach, Oakland, and 
Seattle alone process 11,000 containers per 
day, or about 8 containers per minute.
Because of this high traffic volume, 
U.S. seaports are especially vulnerable to a 
terrorist attack. Illicit radioactive materials 
could be hidden in any one of the cargo-
filled containers that arrive at U.S. ports. 
Yet, searching every shipment would be 
bring legitimate commercial activities to 
a halt. Improving security at U.S. ports 
is thus one of the nation’s most difficult 
technical and practical challenges because 
the systems developed for screening cargo 
must operate in concert with ongoing 
seaport activities. 
Working at this intersection of 
commerce and national security, Lawrence 
Livermore researchers are applying their 
expertise in radiation science and detection 
to develop improved technologies for 
detecting hidden radioative materials. One 
new technology being designed and tested 
at the Laboratory is a neutron interrogation 
system for cargo containers. This system 
will quickly screen incoming shipments 
to ensure that nuclear materials such as 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium 
(HEU) are not smuggled into the U.S.
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“Our goal is to develop a system 
that can detect small targets of nuclear 
material—about 5 kilograms of HEU and 
1 kilogram of plutonium—with low error 
rates of about 1 percent false positive 
and false negative,” Slaughter says. “The 
system we’re developing would permit 
rapid scanning so it wouldn’t disrupt 
commerce. Our goal is to complete the 
scan and report in about a minute.”
An Active Interrogation System
Slaughter and his colleagues consider 
active interrogation to be the most 
promising option for detecting HEU in 
containers. Even moderate amounts of 
shielding make it difficult to passively 
detect radiation emanating from hidden 
sources. The high-energy, gamma-ray 
signature produced when neutrons interact 
with nuclear material is unique, so the 
liquid scintillation detectors can readily 
distinguish it from the signature for 
normal background radiation.
The neutron scan would pose few risks 
to cargo. Most residual radioactivity would 
dissipate within seconds after the scan. 
In the team’s experiments, radiation dose 
rates are low.
The team is also working to minimize 
potential risks to the people who will 
operate the equipment. The project goal 
is to limit radiation exposure to the 
normal allowable doses specified in 
federal standards for the general public. 
“Because people might be inside a 
container during irradiation,” says 
Slaughter, “we want the radiation dose 
to be too small to cause harm.”
Slaughter hopes to see such a system as 
a regular part of cargo container security 
at U.S. ports. Eventually, it might also be 
used at foreign ports to scan containers 
before they are loaded aboard U.S.-bound 
ships. Since 2002, the Livermore team has 
done considerable work related to basic 
science and engineering of the system, 
developing the detector and establishing 
requirements for the neutron generator. 
Research has been conducted at Livermore 
and at the 88-inch cyclotron at Lawrence 
Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). 
The team’s timetable is to build a research 
prototype and evaluate it in a laboratory 
setting during 2005 and then in 2006, to 
field a vendor prototype at a container port.
Detecting the Gamma-Ray Signature 
Use of a high-energy, gamma-ray 
signature to detect nuclear materials 
in containers was proposed by Stanley 
Prussin, a professor of nuclear engineering 
at the University of California (UC) at 
Berkeley, and Eric Norman of LBNL. 
Prussin, now the chief scientist for the 
cargo container project, has long consulted 
with the Laboratory’s NAI Directorate. He 
became involved with the cargo container 
effort in the summer of 2002 while on 
sabbatical at Livermore to work on an 
unrelated project.
Prussin was familiar with Slaughter’s 
work and attended a meeting at which 
modelers discussed the container effort. 
He says, “It didn’t take too long for me to 
become convinced that, under their defined 
worse-case condition, we ought to take 
another look at the technique they were 
modeling.”
Rather than high-energy gamma rays, 
the Livermore team originally considered 
a system that counted delayed neutrons 
emitted by neutron-induced fission. 
Delayed neutrons are emitted from a 
fraction of a second to a few minutes after 
fission and have lower energies than the 
fast prompt fission neutrons. Although 
delayed neutrons can be a reliable 
indication of nuclear materials, their yield 
is low.
Prussin noted a difficulty with using 
delayed neutrons: Hydrogenous cargo—
fruits and vegetables, canned meats, 
wood, plastics—can absorb the short-lived 
neutrons and thus might interfere with the 
delayed neutron count.
“Any system we develop must look for 
fissionable materials that will be very well 
actively search for nuclear materials. 
A truck carrying a container laden with 
suspicious cargo would be towed over 
a generator that would bombard the 
container with neutrons. It would then 
be towed through an array of detectors, 
much like driving through a carwash. If the 
neutrons encountered any fissile material 
shielded and hidden among the container’s 
contents—whether produce, clothing, 
electronics, lumber, automotive parts, or 
other consumer goods—the interaction 
would induce tiny fission reactions. These 
reactions would produce the telltale 
delayed gamma rays of nuclear materials, 
which would be picked up by the detectors.
The Livermore system is not intended 
to screen every container entering a U.S. 
seaport. Instead, it will be used on the 
suspect cargo identified by screening 
procedures, such as radiography or passive 
radiation inspection, that show some of a 
container’s contents.
The 19-member project team draws on 
the talents of personnel from Livermore’s 
Engineering Directorate as well as the 
Physics and Advanced Technologies; 
Chemistry and Materials Science; 
Safety and Environmental Protection; 
Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and 
International Security (NAI); and 
Computation directorates. “To some 
approximation, we work like a soccer team 
of eight-year-olds,” says project leader 
Dennis Slaughter, technical director of 
Livermore’s 100-megaelectronvolt (MeV) 
electron linear accelerator (linac). “By that, 
I mean we all follow the ball. There are no 
established positions. Everyone ‘turns to’ 
the urgent task, and we all help each other 
without disciplinary distinctions.”
Originally funded by Livermore’s 
Laboratory Directed Research and 
Development Program, the detection 
project is now supported by the 
Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). The Livermore team is focused 
on developing a system that is not only 
reliable but also commerce-friendly. 
shielded,” says Prussin. “If the material 
is shielded by hydrogenous material, the 
probability for the delayed neutrons to 
actually escape from the container into 
an external detector is very small. In the 
U.S., we import almost everything under 
the sun, and many of those imports are 
hydrogenous.”
Instead of the delayed neutron count, 
Prussin suggested the team measure the 
gamma rays emitted. Fission products 
make numerous gamma rays that have 
comparable decay characteristics of 
delayed neutrons. Yet, says Prussin, the 
probability of the neutron-induced gamma 
rays escaping from the container through 
hydrogenous material is about 1,000 times 
greater than it is for delayed neutrons.
In 2003, Prussin and Slaughter worked 
with Norman to arrange for a series of 
experiments, funded by the Department 
of Energy’s Office of Science, at LBNL’s 
88-inch cyclotron. The first experiment 
was conducted using a deuteron beam on 
a beryllium target. The researchers also 
bombarded well-shielded sample targets 
of uranium-235 and plutonium-239, 
irradiating each sample for 30 seconds, 
going back and forth to get enough 
statistics for a relevant evaluation. 
“The high-energy gamma rays 
essentially represent a unique signature 
that fission has occurred,” says Prussin, 
“both because of their energies, which 
are above 3 MeV, and because of their 
temporal behaviors.”
Researchers followed up the scientific 
measurements at Berkeley with signature 
verification experiments at a new 
laboratory commissioned at Livermore 
for scanning cargo containers. The 
laboratory houses a 6-meter container 
provided by APL, one of the world’s 
largest container transportation shipping 
companies, and gives the researchers a 
realistic testing environment. In these 
experiments, they irradiated a 22-kilogram 
target of natural uranium with a beam from 
a 14-MeV neutron source. Their results 
confirmed the intensity of the signature in 
a realistic cargo-scanning configuration 
using 150 grams of HEU and a low-
intensity source.
Good Results with Simulated Cargo
In studies using simulated cargo stacked 
round the target, the gamma rays produced 
were very intense, between 2.5 and 4 MeV. 
The neutron beam energy must be high 
enough to penetrate the cargo but low 
enough to avoid interfering activation. 
(The research indicates the neutron source 
should be between 5 and 8 MeV.) Although 
gamma radiation is 10 times stronger than 
delayed neutrons, it is weak but detectable, 
and high-resolution detectors are not 
required to measure it. Large arrays of 
low-resolution detectors, such as liquid 
scintillators, can be cheaply produced and 
easily deployed.
One question the team must resolve 
relates to characteristics of the accelerator 
required for practical field applications. 
“Accelerators that can give the appropriate 
deuteron beam energy intensity on the 
appropriate target can, in principle, be 
manufactured commercially and for a 
reasonable amount of funding,” Prussin 
says. “We don’t know that one has been 
constructed for the exact conditions that we 
will specify, and we may have some technical 
issues to address. But our requirement is not 
for a scientific system. What we will want is 
a much simpler device.”
Meanwhile, the team wants to resolve 
some problems found when using Monte 
Carlo codes to mock up experiments 
and test them on the computer. “We are 
developing a method that seems likely 
to serve our purpose,” says Prussin. 
Experiments on irradiation of uranium, 
which will be conducted at Berkeley, are 
being designed to help the researchers 
understand how well the computational 
procedures can represent the 
experimental data.
Simultaneously, efforts are moving 
forward to develop a large array of liquid 
scintillators that are sensitive to both 
neutron and gamma rays. As currently 
envisioned, the design includes a bank of 
20 liquid-scintillator–filled tubes spanning 
each side of the carwash.
Benefits of Liquid Scintillator
Liquid scintillator is a good candidate 
material for the cargo interrogation 
problem. It has a fast response time, and it 
can be inexpensively instrumented to scan 
a large volume of material, which helps to 
ensure that a large fraction of the particle 
flux emitted by the neutron-irradiated 
nuclear material will be detected. Livermore 
physicist Adam Bernstein, who leads the 
detector design team, says, “Neutrons 
and gamma rays create a  20-nanosecond 
pulse of blue light when they scatter in 
the medium, and this fluorescent pulse 
can be detected in photomultiplier tubes.” 
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The design for the detector system calls for a 
below-ground neutron generator that would 
bathe containerized cargo with neutrons. 
Interaction of the neutrons with fissile material 
inside the container would produce fission, 
followed by delayed gamma rays detected by an 
array of liquid scintillators as the container moves 
through the system.
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Such detectors can be used in various cargo 
detection and interrogation scenarios. For 
example, even with the neutron source off, 
the detector array may still be sensitive 
enough to scan cargo for some types of 
radioactive materials of concern. 
The segmented array, which has a 
response time of about 100 nanoseconds 
or better, would indicate location or 
spatial extent of radioactive material 
hidden in the cargo. And says Slaughter, 
“By establishing the geometric extent of 
the radioactive material, we can better 
differentiate cargo with small amounts 
of uranium distributed throughout from 
normal cargo with a small component of 
nuclear material hidden in it.”
The liquid scintillator project dovetails 
nicely with the Laboratory’s mission, 
says Bernstein. “Livermore in general is 
a center for radiation detection because 
of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
physics research.” He adds that the liquid 
scintillator work is building on a detection 
technology that has been used for years 
in high-energy physics. “These types of 
detectors are often used in fundamental 
physics research, where we engage in 
neutrino physics and dark-matter searches, 
but not for practical applications such 
as fissile material detection. In this 
project, we’re taking a technology that’s 
a workhorse in high-energy physics and 
using it in the real world.”
Using liquid scintillators in such 
real-world applications brings its own 
challenges for detector designers. “We 
have a lot of work to do in developing 
the algorithms for the gamma-ray signal 
that comes out of cargo containers,” says 
Bernstein. “We want to process the signal 
in a different way than we do in a physics 
experiment where we don’t have any time 
constraints and we can wait to obtain 
data. In this application, we have maybe a 
minute to make a decision on whether the 
cargo container is suspicious or not.”
Keeping the false-positive and false-
negative rates low is another technical 
issue facing the designers. “We want to 
optimize the signal-to-background ratio 
as best we can,” says Bernstein, “and 
we’ll have to establish the number of 
false positives that are acceptable. For 
example, if a few hundred cargo containers 
go through the carwash each day, a 
false-positive rate of 1 percent might be 
unacceptable because that could mean 
you stop the chain once a day to remove a 
container for closer inspection.”
Another challenge is to develop a robust 
system, one that can work continually 
for months or years and that can be 
operated by people who are not experts 
in radiation detection. “People frequently 
underestimate that aspect of the 
development process,” Bernstein says.
The team built a small prototype of 
a 0.6-meter-tall detector, which they 
successfully tested. This spring, they are 
working with an array of four detectors, 
each 2 meters tall and 20 centimeters in 
diameter, and according to Bernstein, the 
team expects this testing to result in some 
iterations of the design. By the end of 
2004, the team hopes to be working on a 
larger array that would cover one side of 
the carwash.
“By January or February 2005, we 
should have the full array,” says Bernstein. 
“We most likely will build it at Livermore. 
While we’re designing the prototype, we’ll 
also try to make the system portable, so we 
can take it into the field—maybe even test 
it at a port.”
Slaughter is hopeful that by 2005 the 
Laboratory team will add a commercial 
partner to develop a system that eventually 
could see engagement in the fight against 
global terrorism.
—Dale Sprouse
For further information contact 
Dennis Slaughter (925) 422-6425 
(slaughter1@llnl.gov).
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